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expression through preferred
agents with mini-taxing authority
would destroy the free expression
of ideas. Such channeling would
replace the marketplace of ideas
with corporate utility ideas subsidized with consumer funds. Thus,
the court affirmed the order of the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division.
Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Judge
Titone stated that the challenged
practice represented governmental
acquiescence in private economic
decision making and did not rise to
the level of state action. However,
in accepting the "law of the case"
that state action was involved,
Judge Titone concluded that the
charitable contribution recoupment policy violated the ratepayers' constitutional rights, but not
those guaranteed by the first
amendment.
Judge Titone first reviewed the
majority's analysis of Abood. He
noted that Abood stood for the
proposition that if a state impinged
on first amendment rights, it must
have a compelling interest and
narrowly draft the law to meet its
identified interest. He stated that
unlike the union dues policy in
Abood, the PSC policy did not
implicate or impair the ratepayers'
association rights in any manner.
The concurrence maintained that
in Abood the issue was whether
non-union members could be
forced to pay union dues and thus
be forced to associate with the
union against their will. The concurrence explained that in Abood a
non-union member was forced to
associate with the union by virtue
of her payments to the union and
the union's reciprocal duty to represent her. In contrast, Judge Titone noted that the utilities' rates
did not infringe on Cahill's and
other ratepayers' rights of association. The ratepayers freely associated with the utilities and merely
paid for services received; no compulsory association arose from the
ratepayers' payments of utility
bills. Therefore, Judge Titone refused to apply Abood to Cahill's
claim.
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PSC Policy Constituted Taxation
Without Representation

For the concurrence, the dispositive issue was whether the Constitution prohibited the government
from taxing indirectly through private business entities. The concurrence disagreed with the majority's
objection to the government channeling expression through preferred agents, noting that the government did this whenever it
allowed a tax deduction or credit
for private charitable contributions. Therefore, the problem with
the regulatory scheme was not that
it delegated the spending of taxable
funds to a private entity but rather
that the scheme delegated the power to impose a tax. The concurrence explained that the levy in
this case was impermissible. Tax
levies for the welfare of the entire
community were only permissible
if implemented directly by the government because only the government was directly accountable to
taxpayers through the ballot box.
Thus, Judge Titone concluded that
the delegation of general taxing
authority through the PSC policy
was unconstitutional. The policy
constituted taxation without representation rather than a violation of
the first amendment.
Jonathan E. Barrish

CONNECTICUT
CONSUMERS
PROTECTED AGAINST
DECEPTIVELY
ADVERTISED
MANUFACTURER'S
REBATES
The Connecticut Supreme
Court upheld a regulation restricting net price advertising in Caldor
v. Heslin, 215 Conn. 590, 577 A.2d
1009 (1990). Net price advertising
occurs when a retailer advertises a
product for a price that is the final
price the consumer pays after redeeming the rebate from the manufacturer. The Connecticut Su-

preme Court found such
advertising inherently misleading
to consumers and therefore, not
constitutionally protected.
Background
The dispute arose from a regulation promulgated under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act ("CUTPA"), Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 42-11Ob(a) (1987). CUTPA prohibits deceptive practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce.
In § 42-1 10b(c) of CUTPA, the
Connecticut legislature authorized
the Connecticut Consumer Protection Agency ("CPA") to promulgate regulations addressing unfair
or deceptive business practices.
However, the CPA authority was
limited by § 42-1 10b(c) of CUTPA;
no CPA regulation could be inconsistent with the rules and decisions
of federal authorities in their interpretation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
The CPA promulgated a regulation which provides that net price
advertising constitutes an unfair
and deceptive practice unless the
retailer provides the manufacturer's rebate price to the consumer at
the time of purchase. Conn. Agencies Regs. § 42-110b-19 (1988).
The regulation also provides that if
the retailer merely advertises the
availability of a manufacturer's rebate and does not state the net
price of the item, the retailer would
not be expected to pay the rebate
price to the consumer at the time of
purchase.
Caldor, Inc. ("Caldor"), a New
York corporation which operated
retail stores in Connecticut, sued
the CPA. Caldor sought a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the net price advertising restriction.
The Trial Court's Decision
Caldor argued that the CPA regulation exceeded the agency's authority under CUTPA. In addition, Caldor asserted that the net
price advertising restriction was
arbitrary and capricious and thus
violated substantive due process.
Finally, Caldor contended that the
(continued on page 32)
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restriction violated its right to free
speech under federal and state constitutions.
The trial court, in determining
the validity of Caldor's three
claims, examined the nature of net
price advertising. The trial court
found that retailers frequently use
net price advertising to "grab the
attention" of the consumer. Such
advertising often consists of the net
price in large, bold type, and the
regular price and manufacturer's
rebate information in small type.
Net price advertising is factually
untrue in that the consumer incurs
additional costs such as postage
costs in obtaining the rebate from
the manufacturer. Furthermore,
net price advertising might mislead the consumer into believing
that the net price could be obtained
from the retailer; such pricing information could therefore affect
the consumer's decision to purchase the item. For these reasons,
the trial court concluded that net
price advertising is inherently misleading and deceptive as a matter
of law.
Because the practice was deceptive, the trial court held that the
CPA acted within statutory guidelines in promulgating the regulation. In addition, the trial court
held that the state and federal
constitutions did not protect net
price advertising due to its misleading character. Caldor appealed. The Connecticut Supreme
Court heard the appeal directly.

The Supreme Court of
Connecticut Affirms
On appeal, Caldor claimed that
the trial court erred in upholding
the validity of the regulation on the
basis that net price advertising was
deceptive as a matter of law. Net
price advertising would not be classified "deceptive" if the trial court
had properly applied Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") standards. The Connecticut Supreme
Court focused on the validity of
the regulation, rather than the nature of Caldor's advertising in ad-
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dressing Caldor's claims. The court
emphasized that its review of the
CPA regulation was very limited
and that it would only decide
whether the CPA acted unreasonably or arbitrarily.
The supreme court applied a
three-part test to determine whether net price advertising was a deceptive practice and therefore subject to regulation by the CPA. The
test required that 1) the practice
must be likely to mislead a consumer, 2) the consumer had reasonably construed the message and
3) the misrepresentation or omission was material such that it
would presumably affect the consumer's decision making. After investigating consumer complaints
regarding manufacturers' rebate
programs, the CPA concluded that
net price advertising was inherently misleading. Likewise, the court
determined that the practice was
"deceptive" under the three-part
test. Therefore, the court held that
the CPA promulgated the regulation in accordance with the express
language of § 42-1 10b of CUTPA.
The court noted that the regulation did not conflict with FTC
rules and regulations or federal
court interpretations of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. The federal authorities had neither found
net price advertising deceptive nor
adopted any rules or regulations
inconsistent with the Connecticut
regulation; the federal authorities
simply never addressed the question of net price advertising. The
court stated that a legislative regulation review committee did approve the net price advertising
regulation. However, the court
held that the CPA properly used its
consumer protection expertise and
did not abuse its discretion with its
approval of the net price advertising regulation.
The supreme court then considered Caldor's claim that a prohibition on net price advertising was a
violation of the right of free speech
under the constitutions of the
United States and Connecticut.
Net price advertising falls within
the category of "commercial
speech." The court applied the first
prong of a four-prong test to decide

the validity of the CPA's restrictions on commercial speech. The
first prong of the test requires that
the commercial speech used not be
misleading in order to qualify for
constitutional protection. The
Connecticut Supreme Court had
already affirmed the trial court's
finding that Caldor's net price advertising was misleading. As such,
the regulation of net price advertising failed to meet the requirements
of the first prong of the test. Thus,
the supreme court affirmed the
trial court's decision that the regulation did not violate Caldor's
rights to free speech under the
federal and state constitutions.
The Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Covello
focused on the majority's conclusion that net price advertising was
not constitutionally protected. Justice Covello claimed that this conclusion was based on a factually
unsupported determination that
net price advertising is inherently
misleading. He noted that there
was no evidence at trial of consumers having been misled by the
advertising; the CPA had not received any complaints regarding
the inability of consumers to receive a rebate in the store or to
receive the net price at the time of
purchase. Consumers merely complained about the actual rebate
process. In addition, the FTC had
not determined that net price advertising was unfair or deceptive.
Justice Covello concluded that this
type of commercial speech should
be protected every bit as much as
other kinds of speech. Therefore,
the CPA's restrictions on such
commercial speech directly violated the constitutional rights to free
speech guaranteed by the first
amendment.
Timothy D. Brandhorst
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